Japanimmigration

This article explores whether the concrete processes though which economic internationalization binds major immigration  -receiving countries to their emigration-sending countries are one form of this embeddedness. Elsewhere I have developed such an analysis for the case of the U.S. (Sassen, 1988) and in more theoretical terms (1993). New illegal immigration  into  Japan  raises questions concerning the impact of the internationalization of the Japanese economy on the formation of this flow. Japan has never had immigration, although it has a history of forced labor recruitment, colonization, and emigration. It lacks a belief in the positive contributions of immigration  The concept immigration did not exist in its law on the entry and exit of aliens.Since the mid-1980s there has been an increasing il immigration from Bangladesh, Thailand, the Philippines, Pakistan, and, most recently, Malaysia and Iran. Japan is a major foreign aid donor, investor, and exporter of a wide range of consumer goods in the countries whence originate most of its new immigrants, except Iran. The U.S. has played a similar role in the regions and countries where most of its immigrants originate. The first section of this article addresses the impact of economic internationalization on the formation of new immigration flows into the U.S. during the last 25 years. The second section examines both the magnitude and forms of Japan's recent economic presence in the South and Southeast Asia.The third and fourth sections briefly review questions of policy in the U.S. and Japan during the last few years. The policy issue is now of great concern in Japan. Following an intense two-year debate, a new law was passed and became effective in June 1990, but it proved inadequate and is already under review. The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act been passed than it came under attack and in 1990 a new Immigrant Act was signed. The fifth section conveys evidence of illegal immigration to Japan .The sixth section discusses conditions in receiving countries that make possible the adaptation of immigrants with a view to understand how illegal immigrants in Japan could become part of the Japanese economy. I mmigrant employment is patterned as well; immigrants rarely have the same occupational and industrial distribution as citizens in receiving countries. While it may seem that migrations are ever present, distinct phases and patterns are clearly discernible during the last two centuries. M ass migrations during the 1800s made an integral contribution to the formation of a trans-Atlantic economic system. Before this period, labor movements across the Atlantic had been largely forced (notably slavery) and mostly from colonized African and Asian territories. Similarly, migration to the United Kingdom in the 1950s originated in what had once been British territories, and migration into Western Europe during the 1960s and 1970s occurred within the context of direct recruitment and European regional dominance over the Mediterranean and some Eastern European countries. The renewal of mass immigration into the U.S. during the 1960s took place within the context of expanded U.S. economic and military activity in Asia and the Caribbean Basin. In the 1960s and 1970s, the United States played a crucial role in the development of a world economic system. It passed legislation aimed at opening its own and other countries' economies to the flow of capital, goods, services, and information. This central military, political, and economic role contributed to both the creation of conditions that mobilized people into migrations, whether local or international, and to the formation of links with the United States that subsequently served as bridges (often unintended) for international migration. In the 1970s and 1980s were newly industrialized countries of South and Southeast Asia whose extremely high growth rates were due initially mainly to foreign direct investment in export manufacturing. The United Nations Demographic Yearbook (1985) and World Population Prospects (1987) show that in the: mid-1980s the United States received about 19% of global permanent emigration. A breakdown by region and country of origin shows that it received 27% of total Asian emigration, 81.5% of all Korean emigration almost 100% of emigration from the Philippines. 70% of Caribbean emigration, almost 100% of emigration from the Dominican Republic and Jamaica 62% from Haiti. 19.5% of all emigration from Central America, 52% of emigration from El Salvador, the country with the greatest U.S. involvement in the region. t hree processes as constituting a larger framework within which the new U.S. immigration occurred after 1965: off-shore production; internationalization of major cities, which emerge as centers for international business and for the coordination and management of a global economic system; and the development of conditions in the U.S. that make it an attractive location for foreign manufacturers and other types of firms and, at the limit, would make certain areas of the U.S. competitive with Third World countries as production sims. At least two of these conditions have emerged in Japan as well: rapid growth in off-shore manufacturing and of Tokyo and other major Japanese cities as international business centers. The third development has not occurred in Japan : direct foreign investment is increasing, but is at very low levels.

Migration has increased as a result of links between the U.S. and several Third World countries through the internationalization of production. In major cities there has been an increase in both high-income and low-income jobs as well as casualization of the labor market, thus creating conditions for the large supply of immigrant workers. The increased presence of foreign manufacturing and other firms in the U.S. has contributed to the creation of transnational spaces for economic activity. Immigrant workers in manufacturing have contributed to reduced costs of production. I f there are systemic linkages underlying the current Central European and Soviet migrations to Germany and Austria. Rather than simply posit the push factor of poverty, unemployment, and the general failure of socialism, we might inquire as to whether linkages are facilitating bridges.

We may also ask whether the large pre-1939 migrations to both Berlin and Vienna produced and reproduced migration systems and whether aggressive campaigns during the Cold War showing economic well-being as the norm in the West may have induced many people to migrate westward when conditions might have deterred some of them, though presumable not those who were determined to come at all costs. These historical and current conditions contain elements for specifying systems within which current Eastern European migration to Germany and Austria is taking place (Sassen, 1992, 1993). Japan has traditionally kept its doors closed to immigration, though not to emigration and forced labor recruitment.It is now facing an influx of illegal immigrants from several Asian countries with which it has strong economic ties. These flows have occurred despite Japan ' s closed-door policy. It should also be noted that there has been an increase in the number of legal immigrant workers for low-wage jobs as well as high-level manpower. especially to the financial sector, all under categories of entry that were either introduced or expanded in the new 1990 immigration law discussed below. Although high-level manpower flows are clearly related to the internationalization of the Japanese economy, this is far less evident in the case of the new illegal immigration from Asia. Japan's Growing Presence in Asia Japan's role in the post-World War II global economy has moved from trade orientation to foreign direct investment, foreign aid, and the export of culture in the forms of fashion, architectural styles, and (especially to Asia) new models of success. Together with the export of consumer goods, these various flows have contributed to a strong Japanese presence in many Asian countries. Japan's contribution to global foreign direct investment (FDI) has increased rapidly. By 1982, it had become the leading net exporter of FDI, with a gross outflow of $4.5 billion, surpassing the United Kingdom's $4.4 billion.Although this was well below the $7 billion and $10 billion gross outflows registered for the U.K. In 1980 and 1981 respectively, it emphasized Japan's importance as a capital exporting country. In 1983, a year of general contraction in direct foreign investment, Japan's decline was relatively smaller than that of other leading countries. By 1986, Japan's direct foreign investment flow had risen to $14.3 billion, and by 1987 to $19.4 billion, for a cumulated stock of almost $80 billion. In 1990 it reached $46.3 billion. compared to $40 billion for the U.S. and $24 billion for the U.K. Japan has surpassed most of the leading Western European capital exporters, including West Germany, the Netherlands, and France. Although much of Japan's investment is in the United States, its impact is much greater in South and Southeast Asia where Japan has a strong, complex, and multifaceted past and current presence. Over the last few years, a rapidly rising share of Japan's foreign direct investment has been going to Asia. By 1986, Japan's FDI stock in South, Southeast, and East Asia stood at $22.1 billion, compared to $16 billion by the U.S. Since 1986 much of the rapidly growing Japanese direct investment in Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Indonesia has been in export-oriented businesses centering on the auto and electronics industries. Some Japanese companies have shifted their plants from NIEs (newly industrialized economies) to ASEAN countries. Another important aspect of Japan ' s internationalization was rapid growth in overseas development assistance during the 1980s. Although overseas development assistance is a small share of Japan ' s GNP, in absolute amount it makes Japan the world's leading donor. Japan surpassed West Germany in 1983, France in 1984, and in 1988 became the largest donor, surpassing the U.S. In the 1980s, Japan became the largest single donor of overseas development assistance in Asia. By the mid-1980s, Japan's foreign aid to Asia reached US$15 billion, or 70% of all Japanese aid, compared with U.S. aid of $1.11 billion for Asia and only $500 million for Southeast Asia. In the 1989 to 1990 period, Japan's foreign aid in Asia was $4.8 billion, compared to $1.4 billion by the U.S. Japan accounts for about one-quarter of all foreign aid in Asia and is now the single largest donor in China, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Japan provides almost 70% of the foreign aid to Thailand, and about half of all aid to Malaysia and the Philippines. It accounts only for about one-fifth of all aid to Pakistan and Bangladesh, it is about to become the largest single donor. U.S. Immigration Policy: The Latest Changes The last three major immigration reforms in the U.S., passed in 1965, 1986, and 1990, have sought to control immigration through measures aimed at regulating legal and preventing illegal immigration. The 1965 amendment to the Immigration and Naturalization Act was meant to open up the United States to more immigration, but in a way that would allow the government to control entries and reduce illegal immigration. It sought to eliminate bias against non-Europeans that had been built into earlier immigration law and to regulate the influx of immigrants by setting up a series of preference categories within a rather elaborate system of general quotas. Under this system, preference was given to immediate relatives of U.S. citizens and, to a lesser extent, to immigrants possessing skills in short supply in the United States, such as nurses. The 1965 law brought about major changes in immigration patterns. Emphasis on family reunification should have ensured that the bulk of new immigrants would come from countries that had already provided large numbers of immigrants to the United States. Yet the dramatic rise in immigration after 1965 was primarily the result of an entirely new wave of migration from the Caribbean Basin and South and Southeast Asia. The limitations of U.S. policy were particularly evident in the rapid rise in the number of undocumented immigrants entering the country. Not only did the level of Mexican undocumented immigration increase sharply, but several new undocumented flows were also initiated, mostly from the same countries that provided the new legal immigration. The outcry over rising illegal immigration led to a series of congressional proposals that culminated in the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). This law was intended to rationalize immigration policy and, in particular, to address the problem of illegal immigration. It featured a limited regularization program that enabled undocumented aliens to legalize their status if they could prove, among other eligibility criteria, continuous residence in the United States since before January 1, 1982. A second provision of the law sought to reduce employment opportunities of undocumented workers through sanctions against employers who knowingly hired them. The third element is an extended guest-worker program designed to ensure a continuing abundant and flexible supply of low-wage labor for commercial agriculture. So far, overall effects of the 1986 law has not been uniform. While fewer persons than expected have applied to regularize their status, numbers have been high. On the other hand, there is growing evidence that the employer sanctions program has resulted in discrimination against minority workers who are in fact U.S. citizens; this program has also created conditions for various kinds of abuses against undocumented workers. Meanwhile, illegal immigration has apparently continued to increase following a temporary halt immediately following passage of the law. Congressional efforts quickly set about to correct the law 's shortcomings. In a relatively promising departure from earlier immigration policy. In 1990 Congress approved a new law that sought to give higher priority to applicants who satisfy labor needs in the United States. Employment-based immigration was increased from 54,000 to 140,000 per year. The law implicitly acknowledged that while immigrants account for only about seven percent of the U.S. labor force, they had accounted for 22% of the growth in the work force since 1970 and were expected to represent 25% of growth in the 1990s. The Immigration Act of 1990 also contains a permanent provision for the admission of "diversity immigrants" from underrepresented countries.The New 1990 Immigration Law in Japan The Japanese Parliament recently approved several amendments to the law on the entry of aliens. The Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Law, which was passed by the Diet on December 8, 1989, and became effective June 1, 1990, is a revision of a 1981 revision of an earlier law. On the one hand, the amendments expand the number of job categories for which the country will accept foreign workers typically on three-year stays. These relate mostly to professional occupations such as lawyers, investment bankers, accountants with international expertise, and medical personnel. On the other hand, it seeks to restrict and control the inflow of unskilled and semi-skilled workers. For the first time, sanctions are imposed on those employing and contracting illegal workers, which in many ways replicates efforts made by the United States to control entry. Morita (1992) points out that there had been a set of regulations and practices covering the granting of residence and work permits to foreigners. Yet numbers were small and the overall situation was one of stability concerning all types of entries. In 1980, work permits were granted to 30,000 foreigners, mostly business managers, professors, artists, entertainers, foreign instructors, and skilled workers. By 1989, such permits had increased to 72,000, and by 1991, to over 200,000; however, this still represents a very small proportion of Japan ' s 65 million person work force. The 1990 law establishes 28 categories for legal residence and work. It allows a variety of professional workers as well as the descendants of Japanese immigrants abroad (up to the third generation) to work and reside legally in Japan , with specific lengths of allowable stay. There are three classifications for foreigners to work in Japan. The first covers diplomats, artists, religious personnel, and journalists - categories of workers that operate internationally and do not represent the typical migrant worker. The second classification describes rather precise categories of professional and technical occupations, ranging from financial and accounting experts to engineering and highly skilled craft work. The third classification describes very specific forms of expertise. Temporary visitors, students, and family visitors are prohibited from working. The law also provides for a foreigner already residing in Japan  to apply to the  Immigration  Office for a work permit. This is designed to cover the children of foreigners legally residing in Japan  when they reach work age, rather than illegal workers in unskilled jobs. In terms of control of illegal immigration  (one of the central aims of the new law), two effects have become evident. First, it had a temporary deterrent effect, as did the 1986 IRCA in the U.S. Before the law took effect, about 30,000 Bangladeshis and Pakistanis, who had been in the country illegally, left - presumably to avoid arrest. To avoid a pattern familiar in other countries, in 1989 Japan  cancelled its visa exemption for visitors with the governments of Bangladesh and Pakistan to prevent a great rush of visitors intending to work illegally before implementation of the new law. The new visa agreement made it very difficult to obtain a visa and thus contributed to a huge reduction in the number of visitors, whether genuine or persons intending to overstay and become illegal workers. This policy is not unlike the one that evolved in the U.S. in the late 1980s with known emigration countries: visa applicants from Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Peru, and Ecuador are required to demonstrate means and ties showing that they are on a tourist, short-term business, or similar visit, and plan to return to their country of origin. In 1991, Japan also revoked the visa exemption agreement it had signed with Iran in 1975 and, as with Bangladesh and Pakistan, the effect of the revocation was a sharp decline in entries from Iran. Second, the new law allows the entry of some categories of unskilled labor - "company trainees," students, and Japanese descendants up to the third generation. This has, to some extent, allowed low-wage foreign workers to undertake unskilled routine jobs that require little if any training. Furthermore, the new law also allows students of post-secondary (but not university) institutions, including language and vocational schools, to work for a limited number of hours per week and has consequently become a device to obtain workers for unskilled, lowly paid jobs. Employers can be fined up to two million yen (about $16,000) if they knowingly hire an illegal immigrant, and be imprisoned for up to three years if they continue to employ illegal workers. These are heavy punishments for employers in view of the acute labor shortage, especially in manufacturing. As for the contractors and criminal gangs involved in procuring illegal workers, Morita (1992) considers that the present law is weak in its provisions concerning punishment. The new law also completely leaves out any consideration of the immigrant workers' human rights (Miyajima, 1989).Apprehensions under the new law have increased, but so have the numbers of estimated illegal workers. Apprehensions rose from 22,629 in 1989 to 36,264 in 1990 and 35,903 in 1991. In addition, 27,137, mostly Chinese in boats, were denied landing in 1991, compared with 13,934 in 1990 and 10,404 in 1989.Even though immigrants tend to live in known residential concentrations, there has been no large-scale deportation (Sassen, 1991: Chapter 9). Only a few hundred employers have received sanctions for knowingly hiring illegals. In a country with millions of enterprises and a large number of labor contractors, there are fewer than 2,000 immigration inspectors authorized to check on employers. With weak enforcement of the new law, there appears to be a pattern of growing abuse of illegal immigrants by labor brokers and by immigration officers and police (Miyajima, 1988). The new law is being criticized because it doesn't address the shortage of labor in unskilled, low-paying, or undesirable jobs and therefore pushes some employers to either risk sanctions for hiring illegal immigrants or close their factories. These include employers of not only small, technologically backward factories, but also highly mechanized, technologically advanced factories (Morita, 1992) Two-thirds of Japan's tourists and business visitors come from Asia, as do almost all illegal immigrants. The main nationalities identified in the detected illegal population and in the inferred overstayers population also comprise a large share of Asian tourists and business visitors. In the late 1980s, Japan established off-shore factories and other types of investment in Malaysia; it now appears from apprehensions data that illegal migration of Malaysians is one of the newest flows.n the late 1980s (before the new law was passed), Japan endured a long debate concerning the nature of immigration (Sassen, 1991: 311-314). At the heart of the debate were the concerns of the Ministry of Justice over the maintenance of public order and the concerns of the Ministry of Labor over employment conditions of domestic workers and the nature of labor shortages in Japan. Morita (1992) notes that although the debate was conceived originally as a labor market issue, it eventually incorporated broader issues relating to the pressure of foreigners. The possibility of ethnic conflict and racism can no longer be overlooked. Some analysts have also argued that Japan  should view  immigration  from Asia and Latin America as part of the larger issue of international inequality in social and economic development and make  immigration  policy part of development policy (Nanami and Kuwabara, 1989). The New Illegal Immigration  in  Japan The legal foreign work force in Japan  comprises a broad spectrum of categories, from professionals to unskilled company trainees.(11) It is largely of Asian origin, China, the Philippines, Thailand, and Malaysia being the major sending countries. The majority are women who come in as "entertainers," mainly from the Philippines.(12) Recently, the number of entrants classified as company trainees and students in post-secondary, non-university institutions (mostly language and vocational schools) has increased. The numbers of descendants of Japanese persons born abroad up to the third generation who may work legally in Japan  increased rapidly after 1987. Together with "company trainees" and non-university students, they are seen as a legal supply of foreign workers to fill low-wage, typically unskilled, undesirable jobs. Since the new law was passed in 1990, an estimated 150,000 people have entered each year under these provisions (Morita, 1992). Finally, there are Koreans and Chinese whose origins go back to Japanese colonization at the turn of the century. In 1985, before the rapid growth of illegal overslayers, there were 850,000 permanent resident aliens in Japan , of whom 683,000 were of Korean origin, many third generation. By 1990, the estimated 700,000 Koreans and 140,000 Chinese accounted for 85% of registered alien residents and 0.5% of Japan's  population (see Note 2). Many have been naturalized through having a Japanese parent. The vast majority of Japan ' s legal foreign population reside in large metropolitan areas, particularly Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya. Over 20% of Koreans, 60% of Chinese, and 40% of Filipinos reside in the Tokyo region and about 30% of Koreans, 35% of Chinese, and less than 10% of Filipinos live in the Osaka region. Fragmentary evidence indicates a rapid increase during the last five years in the numbers of foreigners working illegally in Japan  - mostly in the Tokyo metropolitan area, Nagoya, and Osaka, although they are also employed in agriculture. Typically they entered the country on tourist visas and overstayed. Labor contractors, mostly members of organized crime groups, often use illegal documents to bring in foreign workers. A juxtaposition of entries with departures shows that in recent years there have been significantly more entries than departures. Although this may partly be explained by legal multiple-year stays and administrative miscount, among certain nationality groups an increasing num ber of entrants with short-term visas enter to work illegally. For example, in 1987 there were 360,000 Taiwanese entries, but only 314,000 departures; 360,000 Korean entries, and 149,300 departures; 85,300 Philippine entries and 57,600 departures. Figures after 1988 show a distinct increase in entries. Entries from the Philippines more than doubled from about 48,000 in 1983 to 108,300 in 1990. If the experience of the United States is any guide, a growing number of "tourists" and "visitors" will enter the country not to visit, but to find gainful employment. (13) Although not too much should be read into these figures, they do support other evidence that illegal immigration  is achieved through the overstaying of persons on tourist visas. Estimates based on apprehensions and on entry and exit figures suggest that by 1991 there were up to 300,000 illegal immigrants working in Japan , mostly in construction, manufacturing, and bar and restaurant work. Almost all were from Asia, the largest groups being from South Korea (estimated at 100,000), Bangladesh, the Philippines, Pakistan, and Thailand. Since 1988, when the government fully recognized the problem, numbers have kept increasing, although in early 1990 there may have been a temporary halt in new entries, but not in apprehensions Data on apprehensions from the Immigration  Office of the Ministry of Justice analyzed by Morita (1992) help to establish pre- and post-1990 patterns. In the mid- and late 1980s, data for apprehended immigrants show the Philippines as the largest single country of origin, followed by Pakistan, Bangladesh, Thailand, and Korea (see Table 2). Two-thirds of the Filipinos were women, which was also the proportion for the Thai apprehensions. However, women were small minorities in the other major groups.

The high proportion of females among persons apprehended in the mid-1980s was due to the fact that illegal immigrants were mainly "entertainers" recruited for the sex industry. However, in 1989 and 1990, they accounted for only 25% of apprehensions. Alongside this shift toward male apprehensions was a shift in nationalities due to the passing of the law making it more difficult to obtain visas. This largely explains the sharp decline in apprehensions of Bangladeshi and Pakistani nationals in 1991, which also coincided with a sharp fall in tourist entries from those countries and a sharp increase in apprehensions of Iranians, who appear to have replaced Bangladeshi and Pakistani nationals as the most visible illegal population, Japan later canceled its visa exemption agreement with Iran; tourist entries and, by inference, illegal overstays, have also dropped sharply. Overall apprehensions rose from 2,536 in 1980 to 10,573 in 1986, 17,854 in 1988, 22,626 in 1989, 36,264 in 1990, and 35,903 in 1991. Of the 22,626 illegal immigrants apprehended in 1989, 19,105 had over-stayed their visitors visas; fewer than 200 were apprehended for criminal acts. In 1991, overstayers represented 32,820 of 35,903 apprehensions. Only about 2,000 of those apprehended had entered the country illegally in each of these two years. At lower levels this pattern held throughout the 1980s. One category of illegal entry that has increased is illegal boat landing. Although records of such apprehensions are unavailable up to 1982, 2,751 were apprehended in 1986, 11,000 in 1988, and 27,100 in 1991. The number of apprehensions of South Koreans, Thais, and Malaysians has also increased. Except for the Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand, the majority of apprehensions are of men. If immigration  simply reflected the "push" of poverty in sending countries and the pull of plentiful jobs in  Japan , one would have expected a large  immigration  during  Japan's  period of rapid industrialization when there was a huge demand for labor and many of  Japan's  neighbors had still not become industrialized. During this period of large-scale public and private construction, the huge demand for labor was filled mainly by rural migrants to major urban areas.(14) Yet, even though the large rural labor reserves could not satisfy demand, the prospect of foreign workers entering Japan  in the 1950s and 1960s was simply inconceivable. Even today the entry of "simple labor" is forbidden. If immigration  were simply a matter of policy, then the current illegal  immigration  in  Japan  should not have occurred. In the case of the U.S., the law of 1965 had an immense impact because the U.S. had a far-flung network of production sites and military operations in several Third World countries. In addition to a pent-up demand for emigration, there was also a broad network of linkages between those countries and the U.S. That the new law as such could not bring about the new immigration  to the U.S. is also suggested by the fact that, being based on family reunion, it was expected to induce the  immigration  of relatives of persons already in the country, i.e., mostly Europeans. Instead, the vast majority of immigrants came from the Caribbean Basin and several Asian countries. In its period of high growth, Japan lacked the networks and linkages with potential immigrant-sending countries that could have facilitated the formation of international migration flows. As Japan  internationalizes its economy and becomes a key investor in East and Southeast Asia, it is likely to create - wittingly or not - transnational space for the circulation of its goods, capital, and culture, which in turn may create conditions for the circulation of people. We may be seeing the early stages of an international labor market with roles for both labor contractors and illegal immigrants. Labor Demand in Receiving Countries During the late 1970s, there was a rapid expansion in the supply of low-wage jobs in the United States and a casualization of the labor market, both of which were associated with new growth industries and a decline and reorganization of manufacturing (Sassen, 1988, 1991). Tendencies toward casualization facilitate the incorporation of illegal immigration  into labor markets (Sassen, 1988). Casualization opens up the hiring process, lifts restrictions on employers, and typically lowers the direct and indirect costs of labor. The increase in low-wage jobs in the United States is in part a result of the same international economic processes that have channeled investment and manufacturing jobs to low-wage countries. As industrial production has moved overseas, or to low-wage areas in the South, the traditional U.S. manufacturing organization based on high wages has eroded and been partly replaced in many industries by a downgraded manufacturing sector characterized by poorly paid, semi-skilled or unskilled production jobs, and extensive subcontracting. At the same time, the rapid growth of the service sector has created many low-wage jobs in addition to the more publicized increase in highly paid jobs in investment banking, management, and the professions. These sharpening trends toward inequality in the occupational and income structure of the United States are clearly reflected in distribution of earnings. Inflation-adjusted average weekly wages peaked in 1973, stagnated over the next few years, and declined during the 1980s. Although there was an increase in equality of distribution of earnings until 1973, the opposite occurred thereafter. Between 1963 to 1973, nine out of 10 new jobs were in the middle earnings group, compared with one of two new jobs after 1973. If the increase in the number of workers not employed full time and year-round was taken into consideration, then the inequality becomes even more pronounced. Part-time workers (including all types of non-full-time workers) increased from 15% in 1955 to 22% in 1977 and, by 1986, were a third of the labor force. Approximately 80% of these 50 million workers earn less than $11,000 a year. The expected increase in low-income jobs and casualization of many labor markets in the U.S. will probably facilitate the absorption of undocumented immigrants. In this context, the employer sanctions of the 1986 immigration  law and an amnesty program that excludes a large number of undocumented workers will contribute to further erosion in the conditions of these workers and the consolidation of an underclass, defined in both economic and legal terms. Can a growing casualization of labor markets also be detected in Japan  ? Elsewhere (Sassen, 1991: Chapters 8 and 9) I have described in detail the growth of service jobs in Japan , the replacement of many full-time male workers with part-time females, the growth of types of subcontracting that weaken the claims of workers on their firms, and the fact that most new jobs created in Tokyo in the 1980s were part-time or temporary. Since the mid-1980s, average real earnings in Japan  have declined and the manufacturing sector has been losing its wage-setting influence. According to the Ministry of Labor, real earnings increased by 2.9% in 1985 and by 1.4% in 1986. Although the main components of increased earnings used to be bonuses and overtime, closely linked with full-time employment in manufacturing, this category had declined to one percent of the increase in 1985 and to negative 0.5% in 1986. Total cash compensation for full-time employees in establishments with 30 or more employees increased by 5.03% in 1985, 4.5% in 1986 , and 3.2% in 1987 .(16) Unemployment, though small by Western standards, is increasing. The rate though largely frictional in the past, distinct new patterns are emerging and, by 1986, had reached almost three percent. Furthermore, most of the service industries had lower average earnings than the manufacturing, transport, and communications industries. Increases in the hotel and catering, health services, and retail sectors were among the lowest. Growing industries such as finance, insurance, and real estate either pay above-average wages or below-average wages as in other service sectors, a trend common in many western cities (Sassen, 1991: Chapters 8 and 9). Data from the Labor Force Survey in Japan show that the share of part-time workers increased from about seven percent of all workers in 1970 to 12% in 1987. Among female workers, the share almost doubled from about 12% in 1970 to 22% in 1985 and exceeded 23% in 1987.(17) Although the vast majority of part-time jobs are in the service sector, they have also increased in manufacturing. The share of part-time workers in the wholesale, retail, and eating and drinking places has increased from 25.4% in 1970 to 35.1% in 1985, representing an increase from 330,000 part-time workers in 1970 to 1.17 million in 1985, or 41% of the total increase in part-time work. The number of part-time jobs in manufacturing doubled from 400,000 in 1970 to 800,000 in 1985. Female part-time workers increased by 38.2%, or 1.5 million, from 1982 to 1987, a far larger increase than for the labor force generally. Official counts of legal homeworkers in Japan indicate a decline during the last decade. There were over one million such workers, almost all women, in 1987, the largest share (34%) being in clothing and related work, followed by 18.6% in electrical/electronic equipment (including assembly of electronic parts) and almost 16% in textiles. over 80% of the men apprehended between 1987 and 1990 held construction and factory jobs. According to a study of illegal immigrant employment in major urban areas in Japan  carried out by the  Immigration  Office of the Ministry of Justice, factories employing illegal immigrants cover a broad range of categories: metal processing, plastic processing, printing and binding, plating, press operating, and materials coating. An increasing number of women have been apprehended in factories in metals and plastic processing and in auto-parts manufacturing (Ibid.). Illegal immigrants were found generally in medium-sized and small factories. Figures for 1991 indicate a continuation of these patterns: almost half the illegals detected by the government were in construction, while 14% were in manufacturing and certain jobs in the retail industry (especially restaurants). Estimates of illegal immigration  for unskilled jobs point to a growing demand. The Ministry of Labor estimates that Japan's  labor shortage will reach half a million by the end of the decade, but  Japan's  most powerful business organization, the Keidaren (Federation of Economic Organizations), puts the shortage at about five million. Others estimate a range between one and two million by the end of the decade. The largest current shortages are in manufacturing, particularly small-and medium-sized firms, but there is considerable agreement that the service sector will become a major source of new shortages. As Japanese employees in low-skill service jobs retire and young, highly educated Japanese reject their jobs, there may be a gradual acceptance of immigrant workers. All highly industrialized countries have resorted to immigrant workers to fill low-wage jobs in manufacturing and services. Yet not all have experienced the combination of conditions that are evident in Japan  today: the lowest fertility rate among developed countries, one of the fastest growing old-age populations, one of the fastest urbanization rates, rural labor reserves depleted to the point where farmers have resorted to employing immigrant workers (and importing brides, given the shortage of young Japanese women willing to marry farmers). The high educational level required of young Japanese and the ongoing demand for workers in high-paying jobs further reduces the effective supply of labor to fill low-wage, unskilled jobs. Even if current trends continue beyond the recession, and more Japanese are laid off, it is unlikely that they would take low-wage jobs. As in all advanced economies, the labor market is segmented and shortages coexist with unemployment. &n